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1. What legal tools are in place for the purpose of achieving private lands 
conservation in Grenada?  
 
 While Grenada does not appear to have any legislation specifically designed to achieve 
the goal of private lands conservation, there are a number of legislative acts that have the 
potential to help facilitate the attainment of this goal.  Along these lines, the Forest, Soil and 
Water Conservation Act provides that a private landowner may place his or her property under 
the supervision of the Chief Forestry Officer; the National Parks Protection Areas Act authorizes 
the Governor-General to add private land that is leased, purchased, or donated for the purpose of 
conservation, to any national park; and under a National Forest Policy adopted in 1999, the 
Forestry Department is directed to create incentives and other mechanisms to encourage the 
conservation of privately-owned forests.   The World Bank and the Government of Grenada have 
also jointly undertaken a project entitled the Dry Forestry Biodiversity Conservation Project.  Of 
particular relevance to private lands conservation is the project’s goal of assessing the viability of 
providing incentives such as conservation easements to private landowners.  Research for this 
report was unable, however, to find any information on the actual implementation of this project.   
2. What legal tools are recognized by the Grenadian legal system and are capable of 
being used for private lands conservation?  
 
 While easements are recognized under Grenadian law, conservation easements are not 
explicitly recognized by the existing legal system—Parliament has yet to provide legislative 
authority for conservation easements; and English common law presents serious difficulties to the 
goal of using negative easements appurtenant, negative easements in gross, or restrictive covenants 
for conservation purposes.  However, equitable servitudes could be used for this purpose. Equitable 
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servitudes are generally not recognized at law, and are enforceable only if equitable considerations 
demand their enforcement.  
Although certain legal duties and processes affecting private citizens could be 
restructured and used as incentives for private landowners (such as property taxes), the use of 
such incentives would require Parliament to pass an enabling statute. Other possible tools for 
private lands conservation include leases, leasebacks, and profits à prendre. 
3. Given the legal authorities governing land tenure, what novel legal tools 
could be introduced to achieve the goal of private lands conservation in Grenada?  
 
This report recommends that conservationists encourage Grenada’s Parliament to pass a 
conservation easement statute similar to those employed in the United States—and which are 
modeled after the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA). By adopting legislation based 
on the UCEA, numerous U.S. states have eliminated the common law impediments to 
conservation easements—impediments that are present in the existing Grenadian legal system.  
Specifically, the UCEA provides that a conservation easement is valid even though: (1) it is not 
appurtenant to an interest in real property; (2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder; 
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law; (4) it imposes a 
negative burden; (5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the 
burdened property or upon the holder; (6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or 
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.  A unique feature of the Act is the “third-party 
enforcement right.” Under the Act, an easement may empower an entity other than an immediate 
holder to enforce its terms so long as the third party is a charitable organization or governmental 







This report seeks to provide the reader with a basic understanding of legal instruments, 
processes and institutions within Grenada that are relevant to private lands conservation; and to 
evaluate the legal feasibility of introducing conservation easements and other legal instruments 
into the Grenadian legal system for the purpose of achieving private lands conservation. Section 
I of the report provides relevant “background” information on government of Grenada, as well as 
historical and contemporary trends in the Grenadian system of land tenure. Section II of the 
report provides a brief overview of the Grenada’s governmental structure and recognized legal 
authorities.  Section III of the report briefly discusses legislation and other issues relevant to the 
administration of land in Grenada.  Section IV introduces the legal concept of a conservation 
easement, and evaluates the possibility of utilizing this tool within the Grenadian legal system.  
Section V introduces a number of additional tools that have the potential to facilitate private 
lands conservation in Grenada.  The topical sweep of this section includes real covenants, 
equitable servitudes, profits à prendre, purchased development rights, leases, leaseback 
agreements, and reserved life interests.  The final section of the report provides a general survey 
of legislation and other initiatives within Grenada that are relevant to both the administration of 
land and the goal of furthering private lands conservation.  
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
 
A. Governmental History 
 
Grenada has been an independent state within the Commonwealth of Nations since 1974. 
During its brief and chaotic tenure (1979–83), the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) 
revoked the Constitution of 1973—preferring to rule by revolutionary decree (or “people’s 
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laws”).1 Following the U.S.-Caribbean military intervention of October 1983 that deposed the 
short-lived Revolutionary Military Council, the Constitution of 1973 was brought back into 
force. Some judicial provisions established under the PRG were retained, however, for the sake 
of continuity and to facilitate the transition to a more representative government.2  
The Grenadian judiciary has been the branch of government most affected by the political 
events of the post-1979 period.3 Prior to the advent of the PRG, Grenada participated in the 
Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court along with other members of the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS)—as provided for by the West Indies Act of 1967. However, the PRG 
severed this association and established the Grenada Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. 
Magistrate’s courts were retained by the PRG to administer summary jurisdiction.4 
In 1991 Grenada rejoined the OECS court system, with the right of appeal to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in London.5 However, Grenada was among the Caribbean 
nations that voted in 2001 to abolish the right of appeal to the Privy Council in favor of a 
Caribbean Court of Justice (though debate among the participant countries has repeatedly 
delayed the court’s date of operation).   
B. Overview of Land Issues in Grenada 
 
1. Public and Private Land 
 
The state of Grenada includes the islands of Carriacou, Grenada and Petit Martinique, as 
well as several small uninhabited islands. The total land area in Grenada is approximately 84,000 
acres (33,994 ha). However, unlike other members of the OECS, the Government of Grenada 
                                                 
1  Julien R. Creswell, A Civics Handbook on Grenada 21 (1991). 
2  Id. 
3  Id. at 28 
4  Id. at 28–33. 
5  Robert Alexis, Grenada: Legislative and Institutional Framework Review 3 (2000). 
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does not own a significant proportion of this land. Crown lands are estimated at about 10 percent 
of total holdings, with private land ownership making up the remaining 90 percent.6  
The pattern of land use in Grenada has been influenced by the history of plantation 
cultivation, which established large tracks of land in single crop production.7  Private ownership 
of these estates remained intact until the State intervened in a series of land distribution programs 
aimed at increasing the access of poorer and smaller farmers to land. 
Table 1.  Grenada—Basic Statistics 
Population (Year 2000) 101,400 Crown Lands (acres)  8,030 
   Urban Population 38,016 Privately Owned Land (acres) 75,970 
   Rural Population 60,984 Agricultural Land (acres) 35,000 
Total Area (acres) 84,000 Forest Area (acres) 6,950 
 
Source: GOG 1996; Lands & Surveys Division, MOA (2000); OECS Human Development 
Report (2000). 
 
During the postcolonial history of Grenada, citizens were given the right to own land.8 At 
present, with the exception of Grand Etang Forest Reserve, Mt. St. Catherine and a few 
agricultural estates, most of the land in Grenada is privately owned.9 However, while the 
predominance of private ownership has translated into more secure and transferable property 
rights, this has led to land being sub-divided among family members and passed on through 
generations.10 As result the development of very small holdings has proliferated, along with 
difficulties in tracking the ownership of properties.11  
                                                 
6  Allan Williams, Grenada—Country Experience: Land Policy, Administration and Management 9 (2003) 
(hereinafter, Land Policy 2003); see also, Appendix, § A. 
7  Michaeline Crichlow& Regina Duman, Land Use and Land Tenure Patterns in the Windward Islands: An 
Analysis of the Agricultural Sectors of Martinique, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Dominica and 
Grenada, 1970-1990 167 (1994). 
8  Id. at 168. 
9  Land Policy 2003, at 10. 
10  The prevalence of “family land” in Grenada—i.e., land co-owned in undivided shares by the descendants of the 
original purchasers—is a phenomenon that dates back to the abolition of slavery. In Grenada 15 percent of the land 
is classified as family land. Beth Mills, Family Land in Carriacou, Grenada and its Meaning Within the 
Transnational Community: Heritage, Identity, and Rooted Mobility 2–3 (2002) (hereinafter Mills). 
11  Id. at 17. 
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Forest reserves in Grenada have stabilized after a significant loss of forest acreage 
between 1961 and 1975.  Some 6,946 acres (95 percent of this category) of forest is vested in the 
State.12   
2. Land Use Patterns 
 
The majority of Grenada’s 300 towns and villages are located in the coastal areas with 
linear inland extensions along valleys and ridges. Unpopulated areas generally reveal natural 
physical constraints such as steep slopes unsuited for human settlements. A decline in the 
utilization of land in agriculture has been accompanied by increasing poverty levels and 
migration from the rural area into the urban centers. About 60 percent of the population now 
lives in the two “urban” parishes of St. George’s and St. Andrew’s.13  
  
Table 2.  Agricultural Lands in Grenada 
Agricultural Census Agricultural Land (acres) Percent Change 
1961 60,200  
1975 46,600 - 23% 
1981 34,200 - 21% 
1995 35,000 2% 
 
Source: GOG, Central Statistical Office. 
 
The need for housing and tourism development continues to exert pressure on the pattern 
of land use. The 2001 Public Sector Housing Policy and Strategy suggests that the average 
annual demand for housing for the poor would be about 150 new dwelling units for the next two 
decades—representing about 12 acres at an average plot size of 3,000 sq. ft.14 The report offers 
the following land-related factors as influencing the housing sector.15  
(a) Grenadians have a culture of family land holding that complicates land title 
and discourages sub-division and sale; 
                                                 
12  Stephen Bass and James Mayers, Participation in the Caribbean: A Review of Grenada’s Forest Policy Process 
iv (2000). 
13  Thomas Linus, Socio-Economic Profile of Grenada 83 (2000). 
14  GOG, Public Sector Housing Policy and Strategy for Grenada 10 (2001). 
15  Id. at 9. 
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(b) The nature of the economy has been changing from rural agricultural to 
urban service-based, putting a premium on land in areas close to economic 
development; 
 
(c) Land prices have risen sharply in the past two decades, due mainly to the 
relative scarcity of housing plots, population and economic growth and 
expatriate Grenadians and non-Grenadians investing for retirement; 
 
(d) The lack of published land-use plans probably restricts private and public 
initiatives that would otherwise bring new land onto the housing market. 
 
3. General Pressures on Land-Based Resources 
 
The small size of the islands of Grenada limits the area available for various land use 
types. The natural resource base is also under extreme pressure from settlement and tourism 
development, as well as infrastructure, agriculture and forestry demands. These competing 
demands have resulted in such land use problems as deforestation, loss of biodiversity, increased 
soil erosion, shortage of water, decreased agricultural productivity and coastal erosion.16 
4. Squatting 
 
Squatting occurs primarily on Government-owned lands and has been a serious problem 
in the Grand Anse Valley in St. George. In the last two decades, the Ministry of Agriculture has 
regularized over 1,250 plots, 55 percent of which have been in the Grand Anse area.17 
The process of squatter regularization involves surveying the plots, valuation by the 
Valuation Board (usually at below- market prices) and the ultimate transfer of the legal title to 
the occupants. The Grenada’s 2001 Housing Policy and Strategy identifies the following factors 
as contributing to the problem of squatting in Grenada: 
▪ Lack of land use planning or zoning by-laws, which poses a serious 
constraint to the efficient use of land; 
 
                                                 
16  GOG, Ministry of Finance, Initial Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (2000). 
17  Mills, at 129. 
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▪ Inadequate enforcement of existing laws; 
 
▪ With regards to private lands, titling issues related to poorly registered 
inheritance over several generations. 
 




The government of Grenada is a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster 
model. The country is also a constitutional monarchy, with the British monarch—represented by 
a governor-general—as the nominal head of state. Executive authority is vested in a prime 
minister, who is the head of the majority party in the elected House of Representatives, the lower 
house of the two-chamber legislature. The Senate is appointed by the governor-general on the 
advice of the prime minister and the opposition leader. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over Grenada and other members of OECS, with a right for final appeal to the 
Privy Council in London.18 Within the country, cases are initially dealt with by magistrates, 
followed by the High Court and a Court of Appeal.   
B. Legal Authority 
 
 Legal authority in Grenada is derived from the following sources: the Constitution of 
Grenada, acts of Parliament, local governmental laws, judicial holdings and the common law of 
England.  Despite Grenada’s status as a parliamentary democracy, the Constitution of Grenada is 
not an enactment of the Grenadian Parliament. On its face, the Constitution is an “Imperial 
Order-in-Council of The Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty.”19 Additionally, the Constitution has 
never received legislative approval by Parliament, nor has it been ratified in a public 
referendum.20  
                                                 
18  West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order No. 223 of 1967. 
19  Grenada Constitution Order 1973 S.I. 1973 No. 2155 (U.K). 
20  Grenada Constitution Review Commission, The Constitution of Grenada (2001).   
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There are essentially four pieces of legislation dealing with the administration of lands in 
Grenada. These are: 
▪ Conveyancing and Law of Property Act21 
 
▪ Deeds and Land Registry Act22 
 
▪ Land Transfer Valuation Act23 
 
▪ Property Transfer Tax Act24 
 
The common law system of conveyancing still exclusively governs land transactions and 
land ownership in Grenada—though this system has been simplified by the Conveyancing and 
law of Property Act.25  In addition, the Deeds and land Registry Act,26 provides for the 
registration of certain legal instruments affecting land, including wills. 
Under the present system, original deeds are lodged at the Deeds Registry of the 
Registrar General’s Department. Searches are conducted at that Department to trace the 
Vendor’s title or to determine how the Vendor acquired ownership of the land or property being 
sold. The purchaser prepares an abstract of title consisting of a list of documents, facts and 
events setting out the history of ownership of the property and all dealings with the property over 
a period of at least 20 years. The first document contained in the abstract is called the root of 
title. For valid and clear title to be constituted, there must be a chain of title that continues from 
the root to the Vendor free from all encumbrances and without any discontinuities. Title to 
                                                 
21  Cap. 64. 
22  Cap. 79. 
23  Cap. 39. 
24  Cap. 37. 
25  Cap. 64.   
26  Cap. 79. 
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property is either freehold or leasehold.  In the latter case, the term of years can vary from 
periods of 25 years to 999 years. 
Land Transfer Valuation Act27 provides for a system of property appraisal in situations 
where property transfers attract a tax. Pursuant to the Act the Valuation Division of the Ministry 
of Finance determines the prevailing market value of land for tax purposes.  The Act also 
provides that the open market value of the land should prevail over the sale price stated by both 
parties to the transaction.  
The Property Transfer Tax Act28 also imposes a tax payable on the transfer of land. Both 
this Act and the Land Transfer Valuation Act provide for the filing of objections to and appeals 
from the valuations set on land and the transfer taxes assessed by the relevant authorities. If the 
Comptroller (the taxing authority) is satisfied that the land in question is not suitable, intended or 
designated for development (after having consulted with the Land Development Control 
Authority), the Vendor can be exempted from payment of the transfer levy. 
B. Foreign Ownership of Land 
 
All corporations and persons not citizens of Grenada are required by the Alien 
Landholding Regulation Act to apply for and obtain an Alien Landholding License prior to 
purchasing land in Grenada.  Upon successful application a license is issued.  The license fee is 
10 percent of the consideration for the land.  Ownership of property may be in the name of an 




                                                 
27  Cap. 39 (1992). 
28  Cap. 37 (1998). 
29  GOG/OAS, Plan and Policy for a System of National Parks and Protected Areas (2001). 
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C. Security of Tenure 
 
Tenure situations in Grenada vary between freehold and leasehold, with the former 
predominating. In Grenada 72 percent of the land under farms are owned outright; 15 percent are 
operated as family-owned farms; and 12 percent are operated under lease arrangements.30 
One approach to tenure security is found in the Land Settlement Act of 1933.31 Part 2 of 
the Act imposes restrictions on the alienation of lands allotted and sold as small-holdings. In 
particular, small-holdings cannot be encumbered for a period of 3 years and cannot be sold for a 
period of 15 years following the date on which the owner received possession. 
IV.   CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN GRENADA 
 
 In order to understand what legal tools might prove useful to the goal of private lands 
conservation in Grenada, it may be helpful to briefly examine some common law tools—as well 
as statutory codifications of these tools—recognized in the United States. Both Grenada and the 
American legal tradition have their roots in the English common law. In some key respects, 
however, the American common law has deviated significantly from the English common law. 
As discussed below, the deviations identified in this report mark instances where impediments to 
the use of common law instruments for conservation purposes were removed—either by 
progressions in the common law understanding of these instruments or by statutory enactments. 
Thus, an examination of the American common law tradition can help to identify impediments to 
the use of legal tools for conservation purposes in Grenada, as well provide instructive examples 
of how to remove these impediments.  
 The American common law recognizes a number of interests in land that have the 
potential to facilitate the goal of private lands conservation. Among these interests are real 
                                                 
30  Land Policy 2003, at 42. 
31  Cap.161 (1933). 
 11
covenants, equitable servitudes, easements and profits. It is important to note, however, that 
while the common law recognizes these interests, it has traditionally imposed requirements 
that—in many instances—render their use problematic for conservation purposes. The 
Restatement (Third) of Property, part of the legal authority of the United States, has simplified 
the law governing real covenants, equitable servitudes, easements and profits by combining the 
rules governing these interests into a single doctrine—that of the Servitude. This modernized law 
of servitudes has also largely eliminated the common law impediments to the use of these 
interests for conservation purposes. 
A.   Conservation Easements 
 
 Easements have been recognized as legitimate interests in land for centuries. An 
easement is a limited right, granted by an owner of real property, to use all or part of his or her 
property for specific purposes.32  Where this purpose is to achieve the goal of conservation, the 
easement is frequently referred to as a conservation easement.33 A conservation easement is thus 
a voluntary, legally enforceable agreement in which a landowner agrees (usually with a 
governmental entity or NGO) to limit the type and amount of development that may occur on his 
or her property in order to achieve the goal of conservation. They are legally recorded deed 
restrictions that “run with the land” and can be obtained voluntarily through donation or purchase 
from the landowner. 
 Traditionally, an easement was “affirmative” (carrying rights to specified actions) and 
“appurtenant” (attached to a neighboring parcel of land). For example, one landowner might hold 
an easement in the land of a neighbor, allowing him or her to cross the neighbor’s property or 
draw water from the neighbor’s well. In contrast to conventional easements, conservation 
                                                 
32  Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (Bryan A. Garner ed. 1999). 
33  Depending on the type of resource they protect, easements are frequently referred to by different names—e.g., 
historic preservation easements, agricultural preservation easements, scenic easements, and so on.   
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easements are generally “negative” (prohibiting specified actions) and “in gross” (that is, they 
may be held by someone other than the owner of a neighboring property). While a conventional 
easement involves the conveyance of certain affirmative rights to the easement holder, an 
easement for conservation purposes involves the relinquishment of some of these rights and a 
conferral of power in the new holder of the rights to enforce the restrictions on the use of the 
property. This is a critical distinction—the landowner relinquishes the right to develop the land, 
but that right is not conveyed to the easement holder. That particular right (to develop the land) is 
extinguished.34 What the easement holder does acquire is the right to enforce the land-use 
restrictions. 
 To understand the concept of an easement, it is helpful to think of owning land as holding 
a bundle of rights—a bundle that includes the right to occupy, lease, sell, develop, construct 
buildings, farm, restrict access or harvest timber, and so forth. A landowner may give away or 
sell the entire bundle, or just one or two of those rights. For instance, a landowner may give up 
the right to construct additional buildings while retaining the right to grow crops. In ceding a 
right, the landowner “eases” it to another entity, such as a land trust. However, in granting an 
easement over the land, a landowner does not give away the entire bundle of ownership rights—
but rather forgoes only those rights that are specified in the easement document.35  
 
 
                                                 
34  Conservation easements generally extinguish development rights.  However, with certain types of agreements—
such as those involving purchased development rights (PDRs)—the development rights are not necessarily 
extinguished, but instead become the property of the easement holder. PDRs are generally classified as easements in 
gross.  For a more extensive discussion of PDRs, please refer to Part I § A.6. 
35  The grantor of a conservation easement remains the titleholder, the nominal owner of the land. The landowner 
conveys only a part of his or her total interest in the land—specifically, the right to develop the land. However, the 
landowner retains the right to possess, the right to use (in ways consistent with the easement), and the right to 
exclude others. Daniel Cole, Pollution and Property 17 (2002).  
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1.   Appurtenant Conservation Easements36 
 
In legal terms, conservation easements generally fall into one of two categories: (1) 
appurtenant easements; and (2) easements in gross. An appurtenant easement is an easement 
created to benefit a particular parcel of land; the rights affected by the easement are thus 
appurtenant or incidental to the benefited land. Put differently, if an easement is held incident to 
ownership of some land, it is an appurtenant easement. The land subject to the appurtenant 
easement is called the servient estate, while the land benefited is called the dominant estate. 
Unless the grant of an appurtenant easement provides otherwise, the benefit of the easement is 
automatically transferred with the dominant estate—meaning that it “runs with the land.”37 
Under the majority U.S. common law authorities, an appurtenant easement does not require the 
dominant and servient estates to be adjacent to one another—an easement may be appurtenant to 
noncontiguous property if both estates are clearly defined and if it was the parties’ intent that the 
easement be appurtenant.38 There are some jurisdictions, however, that require the estates 
affected by an appurtenant easement to be adjacent.39 In such jurisdictions, there are a number of 
                                                 
36  For a more Grenadian-specific discussion of appurantent conservation easements, see Section IV(B). 
37  Roger Bernhardt and Ann Burkhart, Real Property in a Nutshell 191, 214 (4th ed. 2000). An interest “runs with 
the land” when a subsequent owner of the land has the burden or benefit of that interest.  An appurtenant easement 
runs with the land since the servient estate remains subject to it after being transferred, and the dominant estate 
retains the benefit after being transferred. With an easement in gross, the benefit cannot run with the land as there is 
no dominant estate—however, provided certain requirements are met, the burden can run with the land.  
38  Verzeano v. Carpenter, 108 Or.App. 258, 815 P.2d 1275 (1991) (“[W]e agree with the majority view that an 
easement may be appurtenant to noncontiguous property if both tenements are clearly defined and it was the parties’ 
intent that it be appurtenant.”) (citing 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.02(f)(4)); see also Day v. McEwen, 385 
A.2d 790, 791 (Me.1978) (enforcing reserved “right of an unobstructed view” over servient tenement where 
dominant tenement was on the other side of a public road); Private Road’s Case, 1 Ashm. 417 (Pa.1826) (holding 
that a circumstance in which a navigable river intervenes between a meadow and an island is no legal reason why a 
way across the former should not be appurtenant to the latter); Saunders Point Assn., Inc. v. Cannon, 177 Conn. 413, 
415, 418 A.2d 70 (1979) (holding that while an easement appurtenant must be of benefit to the dominant estate, the 
servient estate need not be adjacent to the dominant estate); Woodlawn Trustees, Inc. v. Michel, 211 A.2d 454, 456 
(1965) (holding that in cases of noncontiguous parcels, the easement over the land of the servient tenement is valid 
and enforceable if, by means of a right of way of some sort which traverses land of another, the servient tenement 
benefits the dominant tenement). 
39  Environmental Law Institute, Legal Tools and Incentives for Private Lands Conservation in Latin America: 
Building Models for Success 23 (2003) (hereinafter ELI). 
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ways to meet—or potentially relax—the adjacency requirement while furthering the goal of 
private lands conservation.  
At this point in the discussion of easements and the manipulation of existing laws in other 
countries to promote new methods of constructing easements for conservation purposes, it is 
important to emphasize that Grenada departs significantly in its interpretation of the structure of 
easements from the majority U.S. common law authorities. Easements, under the English 
common law tradition, must be appurtenant and adjacent. In fact, easements in gross—negative 
or affirmative—are not recognized at all by the English common law.40 Grenada, by virtue of 
being “stuck” within the confines English property law, has not advanced to the degree that other 
countries have in their approach to using creative techniques for conservation in conjunction 
with easements. Therefore, the following methods employed by other countries for private lands 
conservation would not be applicable to Grenada. However, because it is conceivable that the 
Parliament of Grenada could authorize these methods through the enactment of enabling statutes, 
it is helpful to briefly address the practices that have been successful in other places. The 
following list is a brief sample of such methods: 
a. Purchase by NGOs of land that can serve as adjacent estates41 
 
One method for meeting an adjacent lands requirement is for an NGO to acquire—by 
purchase or donation—land adjacent to the property to be subject to the easement. This allows the 
NGO’s property to be the dominant estate, and the NGO to hold the easement over adjoining lands.  
                                                 
40   According to The Laws of England: 
A person possesses an easement in respect of his enjoyment of some estate or interest in a particular piece of 
land, and the easement is said to be appurtenant to that land (d).  No one can possess an easement irrespective 
of his enjoyment of some estate or interest in a particular piece of land, for there is no such thing as an 
easment in gross (e). 
11 THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 235-236 (Earl of Halsbury et al. eds., Butterworth & Co. Law Publishers 1910) (hereinafter LAWS OF 
ENGLAND) (emphasis added). 
41  The information in Part I § A.2 (a) – (e) is taken primarily from ELI at 23–24. 
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b.  Creative “nexus” arguments for non-adjacent lands 
 
Another potential method for creating a valid appurtenant easement between non-adjacent 
properties is to establish (e.g., by successfully arguing its existence in a court of law) an adequate 
nexus between the properties in question. In Costa Rica, the Center for Environmental Law and 
Natural Resources (CEDARENA) created an appurtenant easement between a parcel of private 
land and a nearby state reserve that shared the same birds.  
c.  Reciprocal easements 
 
Reciprocal easements enable adjacent landowners to limit their respective land uses 
through easements granted to each other—a method that provides protection for both 
properties.42 Working with private landowners, conservation groups in Latin America have used 
reciprocal easements that grant a third-party NGO the right to enforce the easement—with 
express authority to enter the property, monitor compliance, and seek judicially enforcement of 
the rights and obligations derived from the easement. Thus, the use of reciprocal easements can 
potentially provide a conservation NGO with enforceable rights over land, without the need for 
the NGO to own adjacent land.   
d.  Use of public lands as the dominant estate to hold an easement 
 
In several Latin American countries, easements over private land have been created using 
adjacent or nearby public lands as the dominant estate. In some instances, the easements have 
also provided a third-party NGO with the right to enforce its terms.   
 
 
                                                 
42  In order to take advantage of federal and state tax incentives, U.S landowners must grant the conservation 
easement to either a governmental entity or an authorized NGO. Thus, while the use of reciprocal easements 
between private landowners is potentially an effective method for achieving private lands conservation, conservation 
incentives provided under U.S. federal and state law would not be available for this type of arrangement. 
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e.  Legal Limitations and Uncertainties to Third-Party Enforcement 
 
The common law—or civil code—of some jurisdictions only recognizes the right of an 
easement’s holder to enforce its terms. Thus, depending on the jurisdiction in question, the 
practice of granting a third-party NGO the right to enforce the easement may or may not survive 
legal scrutiny. Additionally, the relevant legal authority is often unclear as to whether the grant 
to an NGO of the right to monitor and enforce an easement is a real property right that runs with 
the land, or a personal right enforceable only against the original maker of the easement.  
Under the common law adhered to in the U.S., third party enforcement of a conservation 
easement would be invalidated in court due to a basic principle of contract law which mandates 
only the parties to the contract may enforce its terms. However, many U.S. states have laws 
authorizing the assignment of this specific power to non-profit organizations—provided the 
assignment is written into the conservation easement. 
Unfortunately, the common law tradition of Grenada would most likely not recognize 
third-party enforcement. The easement is created on the servient estate solely for the benefit of 
the dominant estate. It must be stressed that the “right constituting the easement must be in some 
way connected with the enjoyment of the dominant tenement.”43 The only individual who can 
enforce the easement is the owner in possession of the dominant estate.44 
2.   Conservation Easements in Gross45 
 
Unlike an appurtenant easement, an easement in gross is not created for the benefit of any 
land owned by the owner of the easement, but instead attaches personally to the easement 
                                                 
43    LAWS OF ENGLAND, at 242. 
44     See id. at 332. 
45  See also Section IV(B). 
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owner—regardless of whether the owner of the easement owns any land.46 At common law an 
easement in gross could not be transferred. Today, however, there are many jurisdictions where 
legislation and more modern trends in the relevant common law have authorized the 
transferability of easements in gross.47 Nonetheless, because English common law tradition 
adhered to by Grenada does not recognize easements in gross (as countries following the 
American common law tradition have), these types of easements are also not valid in Grenada.48 
As noted above, both an appurtenant conservation easement and a conservation easement 
in gross meet the legal criteria for what is known as a negative easement—an easement that 
prohibits the owner of the servient-estate from doing something. Conservation easements are 
negative in character because they prevent the owner of the burdened estate from developing the 
land, typically in any way that would alter its existing natural, open, scenic, or ecological 
condition. However, while the common law has generally recognized and enforced certain 
limited types of negative easements, it has generally refused to enforce negative easements in 
gross. Due to doubts over the validity and transferability of negative easements in gross at 
common law, statutes have been enacted in most U.S. states authorizing conservation 
easements—both in gross and appurtenant.49 
 
 
                                                 
46  Examples of typical easements in gross include the right of a non-owner to harvest timber, mine minerals, 
extract water or other items from the owner’s land.  
47  Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes, §4.6 (T.D. No. 4, 1994), provides that all easements in gross are 
assignable unless contrary to the intent of the parties. It eliminates the restriction of the first Restatement that only 
commercial easements in gross are assignable.  
48    See LAWS OF ENGLAND, at 235-236. 
49  Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, Property 856 (4th ed. 1998).  Traditionally, courts have disfavored 
interests conveyed “in gross” and negative easements because they can cloud title and may raise recordation 
problems— the difficulty being notice to future landholders. However, in the U.S. legislation with proper 
recordation requirements and limitations upon those who may hold these kinds of interests have largely overcome 
these objections. 
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3.  The Uniform Conservation Easement Act 
 
In order to facilitate the development of state statutes authorizing landowners to create 
and convey conservation easements and government agencies and nonprofits to hold such 
easements, in 1981 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted 
the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA). The Act’s primary objective is to enable 
“private parties to enter into consensual arrangements with charitable organizations or 
governmental bodies to protect land and buildings without the encumbrance of certain potential 
common law impediments.”50 
The UCEA defines “conservation easement” as “[a] nonpossessory interest of a holder in 
real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include:  (1) 
retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property; (2) assuring its 
availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open space use; (3) protecting natural 
resources; (4) maintaining or enhancing air or water quality; or (5) preserving the historical, 
architectural, archeological, or cultural aspects of real property.51 
The UCEA has made conservation easements more certain devices by eliminating several 
common law impediments. Specifically, the UCEA provides that a conservation easement is 
valid even though: (1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property; (2) it can be or has 
been assigned to another holder; (3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally 
at common law; (4) it imposes a negative burden; (5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the 
owner of an interest in the burdened property or upon the holder; (6) the benefit does not touch 
or concern real property; or (7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.52  
                                                 
50   UCEA, Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 166 (1996). An online copy of the UCEA is available at the following 
address: http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ucea81.htm.  
51  UCEA, §1(1)—Definitions.  
52  § 4, 12 U.L.A. 179. 
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A unique feature of the Act is the “third-party enforcement right.” Under the Act, an 
easement may empower an entity other than an immediate holder to enforce its terms. The third-
party must be a charitable organization or governmental body eligible to be a holder. 
Additionally, one organization may own the easement, but delegate enforcement to another, 
provided the terms of the easement allow it. 
Just as the UCEA eliminated common law impediments to the functioning of 
conservation easements in several of the United States, passage of a statute authorizing 
something akin to the UCEA by the Parliament of St. Vincent would lend a security and 
efficiency to the creation of conservation easements on the islands that presently does not exist. 
4.  Tax Incentives Under the UCEA 
 
What incentive does a private landowner have to convey valuable development rights to 
either a public or private trustee? In the United States, along with the desire of landowners to 
preserve undeveloped land, the answer is often money—received in the form of tax benefits (e.g., 
income, property, gift and estate taxes) or cash payments. For instance, U.S. landowners who 
donate conservation easements that satisfy requirements of the Internal Revenue (IRS) Code can 
take advantage of federal income and estate tax benefits. To satisfy the relevant section of the 
Internal Revenue Code, a conservation easement must be granted— 
a. to a governmental entity or charitable organization that meets certain public 
support tests; and  
 
b. exclusively for conservation purposes, which include (1) the preservation of 
open space for scenic enjoyment pursuant to a clearly delineated 
governmental conservation policy; (2) the preservation of land for outdoor 
recreation; (3) the protection of the natural habitat of wildlife or plants; and 
(4) the preservation of historically important land or a certified historic 
structure.53 
 
                                                 
53  IRS Code, § 170(h). 
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If a conservation easement satisfies these requirements, the grantor may then receive a charitable 
deduction for the difference in property’s value before the easement was granted compared to the 
property’s value after the granting of the conservation easement. This is often referred to as the 
“before and after” test.54 In addition to federal tax incentives, U.S. landowners can frequently 
take advantage of a variety of state tax incentives.   
B.   Easements Grenada 
 
 There appears to be no legal authority in the Grenada that deals with—or even 
mentions—the use of “conservation easements” per se.  Easements, however, are a well-
established interest in the English common law tradition, created when a “nonowner” possesses 
positive rights (to do something) or negative rights (to prevent something being done) over 
another’s land.55  
 The Appurtenant Conservation Easement.56  Given that an appurtenant conservation 
easement prevents the owner of the servient-estate from doing something, it might logically be 
considered a “negative easement”—a property interest that is an established part of the English 
common law tradition adhered to by Grenada.  A negative easement is the right of the dominant-
estate owner to stop the servient-estate owner from doing something on the servient estate.  Prior 
to Queen Victoria’s reign, English courts had recognized four types of negative easements: the 
right to stop your neighbor from (1) blocking your windows, (2) interfering with air flowing to 
                                                 
54  For federal income tax purposes, this difference in value is a charitable deduction which can be used for a 
period of up to 5 years to reduce the income tax of the grantor of the easement. The maximum deduction in any year 
is 30 percent of the grantor’s adjusted gross income. For federal estate tax purposes, the grant of the easement results 
in a lower valuation of the property—and thus, a lower valuation of the estate to which the federal estate tax will be 
applied. Under the Farm and Ranch Protection Act (1997), IRS Code § 2031.c, landowners can receive an exclusion 
from federal estate taxes for up to 40 percent of the value of their land under a conservation easement. Only 
easements granted in perpetuity are eligible for federal tax benefits. 
55  Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, Cap. 64, § 123; Baptiste v. Sylvester, High Court of Justice, Civil Suit 
No. 598 of 1992 (2001). 
56  This discussion of appurtanent conservation easements also involves the concept of an equitable servitude.  
Equitable servitudes are specifically addressed at Section V(B).  For more on appurtenant conservation easements, 
see Section IV(A)(1).  
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your land in a defined channel, (3) removing the support of your building, and (4) interfering 
with the flow of water in an artificial stream.57 However, English courts in the nineteenth century 
refused to recognize any new servitudes other than these limited types as easements—a limit 
which remains a part of English common law today. Thus, within the common law tradition 
adhered to by Grenada an appurtenant conservation easement would not be considered a negative 
easement, but would instead be viewed as a “negative promise”—i.e., a promise to not do 
something.   
 Under English common law, negative promises that are not one of the four permitted 
types of negative easements are given effect as “real covenants” or “equitable servitudes.”  The 
English common law tradition, however, does not recognize real covenants (negative or 
otherwise) between fee owners. Pursuant to this tradition, an appurtenant conservation 
easement—which is a negative promise between fee owners—would be enforceable only as an 
“equitable servitude.”58 
 While English courts closed the books on negative easements in the nineteenth century, 
courts of equity soon began to enforce negative promises between the parties as equitable 
servitudes. Equitable servitudes became the equivalent of negative easements, but subject to a 
different set of rules developed in chancery.59 
 An equitable servitude is a covenant respecting the use of land enforceable against 
successor owners or possessors in equity regardless of its enforceability at law (a covenant is a 
promise respecting the use of land; and easement is a grant of an interest in land).  Equity 
requires that parties intend the promise to run, that a subsequent purchaser have actual or 
                                                 
57  Dukeminier and Krier, Property 854 (4th ed. 1998). 
58  See Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1834).   
59  Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); Haywood v. Brunswick Permanent Benefit Bldg. Soc., 8 Q.B.D. 
403 (1881). 
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constructive notice of the covenant, and that the covenant touch and concern the land.  Under the 
English common law, covenants run in equity against successors who give no consideration 
(donees, heirs, will beneficiaries), whether or not they have notice. All subsequent possessors are 
bound by the servitude, just as they are bound by an easement.  However, for a person other than 
the original covenantee to enforce the benefit, in some jurisdictions the beneficiary must show 
that he acquired title to his land from the covenantee, either before or after the covenant was 
made.  
 Although an equitable servitude starts out as a promise in equity, in the course of time it 
becomes an interest in land. Unlike a real covenant, which attaches to an estate in land, an 
equitable servitude “sinks its tentacles into the soil, burdening the land itself and not the 
estate.”60 In this sense it is similar to an easement.61 The traditional difference between real 
covenants and equitable servitudes relates to the remedy sought. The remedy for breach of a real 
covenant is damages in a suit at law. The remedy for breach of an equitable servitude is an 
injunction or enforcement of a lien in a suit in equity.  
As the above analysis indicates, the common law tradition adhered to by Grenada would 
not recognize the validity of an appurtenant conservation easement as such.  However, within 
this tradition it is possible that an appurtenant conservation easement would be recognized and 
judicially enforced as an equitable servitude.   
The Conservation Easement in Gross.62 The English common law tradition does not 
recognize an easement in gross—which essentially means the burden of an easement in gross 
will not run to assigns of the burdened land.  And while this tradition would likely construe an 
easement in gross as an equitable servitude, English courts have held that the burden of an 
                                                 
60  5 Richard R. Powell, The Law of Real Property  670[2] (rev. ed. 1996). 
61  See e.g., Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877). 
62  For more on conservation easements in gross, see Section IV(A)(2). 
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equitable servitude will not run if the benefit is in gross. For a servitude to run, there must be 
both a servient and a dominant tenement.63 
V.   ADDITIONAL LEGAL TOOLS FOR PRIVATE LANDS CONSERVATION 
 
A.   Real Covenants 
 
A real covenant, under both American and English common law traditions, is generally 
defined as a promise concerning the use of land that (1) benefits and burdens both the original 
parties to the promise and their successors and (2) is enforceable in an action for damages.64 A 
real covenant gives rise to personal liability only. It is also enforceable only by an award of 
money damages, which is collectible out of the general assets of the defendant.65 If the promisee 
sues the promisor for breach of the covenant, the law of contracts is applicable. If, however, a 
person who buys the promisee’s land is suing, or a person who buys the promisor’s land is being 
sued, then the law of property is applicable.66 The rules of property law thus determine when a 
successor owner can sue or be sued on an agreement to which he or she was not a party. Two 
points are essential to understanding the function of these rules. First, property law distinguishes 
between the original parties to the covenant and their successors. Second, each real covenant has 
two “sides”—the burden (the promissor’s duty to perform the promise) and the benefit (the 
promissee’s right to enforce the promise). 
In order for the successor to the original promissor to be obligated to perform the 
promise—that is, for the burden to run—the common law traditionally required that six elements 
must be met: (1) the promise must be in a writing that satisfies the Statute of Frauds; (2) the 
                                                 
63  London County Council v. Allen, 3 K.B. 642 (1914). 
64  Promises that restrict permissible uses of land are referred to as negative or restrictive covenants.  
65  This historic remedy for breach of a real covenant is damages, measured by the difference between the fair 
market value of the benefited property before and after the defendant’s breach. 
66  English courts never extended the concept of real covenants outside the landlord-tenant context. American 
courts, however, extended it to promises between fee simple owners or neighbors.   
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original parties must intend to bind their successors; (3) the burden of the covenant must “touch 
and concern” land;67 (4) horizontal privity must exist;68 (5) vertical privity must exist;69 and (6) 
the successor must have notice of the covenant. In contrast, the common law traditionally 
required only four elements for the benefit of a real covenant to run to successors: (1) the 
covenant must be in a writing that satisfies the Statute of Frauds; (2) the original parties must 
intend to benefit their successors; (3) the benefit of the covenant must touch and concern land; 
and (4) vertical privity must exist. 
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) has eliminated a number of these 
traditional common law requirements. The horizontal privity requirement and the prohibition on 
third party beneficiaries have been entirely eliminated. Also, the prohibition on covenant benefits 
in gross, the touch and concern requirement, and the vertical privity doctrine have been replaced 
with doctrines designed to more effectively accomplish their respective purposes. Pursuant to the 
Restatement’s approach, a covenant is a servitude if either the benefit or the burden runs with the 
land. The benefit or burden of a real covenant runs with the land where (1) the parties so intend; 
(2) the covenant complies with the Statute of Frauds; and (3) the covenant is not otherwise illegal 
or violative of public policy.70 
                                                 
67  For the covenant to “touch and concern land,” it must relate to the direct use or enjoyment of the land. A 
covenant that restricts the development on a parcel meets this requirement. 
68  The common law traditionally requires that the original parties have a special relationship in order for the 
burden to run, called horizontal privity. In some U.S. states, horizontal privity exists between the promissor and the 
promisee who have mutual, simultaneous interests in the same land (e.g., landlord and tenant). Other U.S. states also 
extend horizontal privity to the grantor-grantee relationship. 
69  Vertical privity concerns the relationship between an original party and his or her successors. Vertical privity 
exists only if the successor succeeds to the entire estate in land held by the original party. 
70  Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) §§ 1.3, 1.4 (2000). Under the Restatement, a covenant burden or 
benefit that does not run with land is held “in gross.” A covenant burden held in gross is simply a contractual 
obligation that is a servitude because the benefit passes automatically to successors to the benefited property. A 
covenant benefit held in gross is a servitude if the burden passes automatically to successors to the land burdened by 
the covenant obligation. 
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Grenada would most likely recognize those iterations of real covenants honored under the 
English common law. However, there is little to suggest that the Restatement’s approach would 
be honored in Grenada. 
B.   Equitable Servitudes 
 
The primary modern tool for enforcing private land use restrictions is the equitable 
servitude.71 An equitable servitude is a promise concerning the use of land that (1) benefits and 
burdens the original parties to the promise and their successors and (2) is enforceable by 
injunction. The usual remedy for violation of an equitable servitude is an injunction, which often 
provides more effective relief for conservation purposes than compensatory damages.  
Under traditional common law rules,72 for the burden of an equitable servitude to bind 
the original promissor’s successors four elements must be met: (1) the promise must be in a 
writing that satisfies the Statute of Frauds or implied from a common plan;73 (2) the original 
parties must intend to burden successors; (3) the promise must “touch and concern” land; and (4) 
the successor must have notice of the promise. In contrast, the traditional common law only 
required three elements to be met for the benefit to run to successors: (1) the promise must be in 
writing or implied from a common plan; (2) the original parties must intend to benefit 
successors; and (3) the promise must “touch and concern” land.  
                                                 
71  There is some doctrinal confusion regarding the difference—if any—between an equitable servitude and a 
conservation easement. However, under the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Property, easements, 
profits, covenants—including equitable servitudes, are governed by a single body of law. See Susan F. French, 
Highlights of the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 226, 
227 (2000). 
72  Traditional common law rules are being distinguished here from the modernized law of servitudes set forth by 
the Restatement (Third) of Property. 
73  If a developer manifests a common plan or common scheme to impose uniform restrictions on a subdivision, the 
majority of U.S. courts conclude that an equitable servitude will be implied in equity, even though the Statute of 
Frauds is not satisfied. The common plan is seen as an implied promise by the developer to impose the same 
restrictions on all of his or her retained lots. 
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Under the law of servitudes set forth by the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes), 
there are eight basic rules that govern expressly created servitudes:74 (1) a servitude is created by 
a contract or conveyance intended to create rights or obligations that run with the land if the 
servitude complies with the Statute of Frauds; (2) the beneficiaries of a servitude are those 
intended by the parties; (3) servitude benefits held in gross are assignable unless contrary to the 
intent of the parties;75 (4) a servitude is valid if it is not otherwise illegal or against public policy; 
(5) a servitude is interpreted to carry out the intent or legitimate expectations of the parties, 
without any presumption in favor of free use of land; (6) servitude benefits and burdens run to all 
subsequent possessors of the burdened or benefited property;76 (7) servitudes may be enforced by 
any servitude beneficiary who has a legitimate interest in enforcement, whether or not the 
beneficiary owns land that would benefit from enforcement; and (8) servitudes that have not 
been terminated may be enforced by any appropriate legal and equitable remedies. 
                                                 
74  As noted above, under the “integrated approach” adopted by the Restatement (Third), easements, real 
covenants, profits and equitable servitudes are all categorized as servitudes 
75  Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.6 (1)–(2) (2000). Early law prohibited the creation of servitude 
benefits in gross and the creation of servitude benefits in persons who were not immediate parties to the transaction. 
However, under the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes), the benefit of a servitude may be created to be 
held in gross, or as an appurtenance to another interest in property. Also, the benefit of a servitude may be granted to 
a person who is not a party to the transaction that creates the servitude.  
 Homeowner associations are entitled to enforce covenants despite owning the fact that they do no own land. 
See, e.g., Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 109 Ill.App.3d 689, 440 N.E.2d 1264 (1982), aff’d, 99 Ill.2d 182, 
457 N.E.2d 1226 (1983); Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass’n v. Heda, 11 Ill.App.2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 
556 (1956); Neponsit Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938). 
 Courts have also held that developers are entitled to enforce covenants after selling all their lots if intended to 
have the power to do so. See, e.g., Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 95 N.E. 216 (1911); 
Christiansen v. Casey, 613 S.W.2d 906 (Mo.Ct.App.1981). 
 Even where a conservation easement is not authorized by statute, courts have recognized the benefit in gross as 
a valid and enforceable interest. See e.g., Bennett v. Commissioner of Food and Agriculture, 576 N.E.2d 1365 
(Mass.1991) (where beneficiary of a restriction is the public and restriction reinforces a legislatively stated public 
purpose, old common law rules barring creation and enforcement of easements in gross have no continuing force; 
question is whether bargain contravened public policy when made and whether enforcement is consistent with 
public policy and reasonable). 
76  Special rules govern servitude benefits and burdens that run to life tenants, lessees, and persons in adverse 
possession who have not yet acquired title.  
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Grenada follows traditional English common law, which recognizes equitable servitudes 
only when equitable principles would so require. Thus, equitable servitudes are a possible tool 
for private conservation in Grenada. 
C.   Profits à Prendre 
 
A profit à prendre (or profit) is a common law interest in land that gives a right to enter 
and take part of the land or something from the land.77 Although it is not commonly used for 
conservation purposes, profits à prendre have the potential to facilitate the conservation of 
private lands.  For instance, a landowner that wishes to protect the timber on his or her property 
could grant a profit à prendre to a conservation group with respect to that timber.78 The 
conservation organization would have the exclusive right to decide whether and what trees to 
cut. By granting such a right to a conservation group, the landowner would prevent future 
owners of the land from harvesting the trees, since that right has been given away. Under the 
common law, a landowner can grant a profit à prendre to anyone—there is no requirement that 
the holder of a profit à prendre own adjacent property.79 
A landowner creates a profit à prendre by granting it in writing to the profit à prendre 
holder. The landowner specifies precisely what the holder is allowed to enter the land to take. 
Once the landowner has granted a profit à prendre, he or she must respect its terms. The profit à 
prendre holder can sue if the owner deals with the land in a way that detracts from the rights of 
                                                 
77  See 28A C.J.S. Easements § 9 (noting that a “right to profits à prendre is a right to take a part of the soil or 
product of the land of another. It is distinguishable from a pure easement.” Historically, there were five types of 
profits à prendre depending on the subject matter of the profit: (1) rights of pasture—where the taking is done by the 
mouths of the grazing animals; (2) rights of piscary—to harvest the fish; (3) rights of turbary—to cut turf or peat as 
fuel; (4) rights of estover—to take wood necessary for furniture for a house; and (5) a miscellaneous group referring 
to the taking and using of sand, gravel, stone, etc. A profit à prendre cannot generally be used to take minerals. 
78  To help ensure its legal validity, a profit à prendre designed to facilitate conservation should be used only where 
the protected interest is something that can be taken from the land—e.g., timber, fish, pasture, or something similar. 
Otherwise, it is possible a court would construe the document as an easement and thus apply the far much more 
restrictive rules governing easements. However, despite this limitation it may nonetheless be possible to use a profit 
à prendre to protect things that are not included in these categories of removable items. For instance, a landowner 
could protect spotted owls by granting a profit à prendre to a conservation organization for the harvest of timber. 
79  Profits à prendre of this kind are called profits en gross.   
 28
the profit à prendre holder. The holder of a profit à prendre can also sue anyone interferes with 
the profit à prendre.80 
A profit à prendre document is designed to outlive the landowner—and perhaps even the 
profit à prendre holder. In creating a profit à prendre, it is thus essential to consider potential 
conflicts between a landowner and a profit à prendre holder and describe exactly what the parties 
intend in the document itself. To protect the profit à prendre holder if the land is subsequently 
sold, the profit à prendre should be registered in the appropriate land title office. The profit 
holder can lease, sell, give away or bequeath the profit à prendre to someone else. The holder can 
also terminate a profit à prendre by giving a written release to the landowner, which would then 
be registered in the land title office. 
English common law recognizes the previously delineated characteristics and treatments 
of profits. Because these servitudes have long been recognized under the common law of 
England, they most likely could be serviceably employed for conservation purposes in Grenada. 
D.   Purchased Development Rights  
 
In the U.S., purchased development rights (PDR) are voluntary legal agreements that 
allow owners of land meeting certain criteria to sell the right to develop their property to local 
governmental agencies, a state government, or to a nonprofit organization. A conservation 
easement is then placed on the land. This agreement is recorded on the title to permanently limit 
the future use of the land. A PDR is thus an interest in real property that is nonpossessory and 
entitles its holder to enforce certain land use restrictions or to enforce certain rights to public use 
or access upon the holder of the possessory interest.81 
                                                 
80  Conversely, the profit à prendre holder must respect the rights of the landowner. The landowner can sue the 
profit à prendre holder if the holder interferes with the landowner’s rights. 
81  At common law PDRs closely resemble negative easements in gross. With the exception of commercial 
easements in gross, easements in gross were not transferable and expired with the holder. These common law and 
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Under a PDR agreement, the landowner retains all other ownership rights attached to the 
land. The buyer essentially purchases the right to develop the land and retires that right 
permanently, thereby assuring that development will not occur on that particular property. Used 
strategically, a PDR program can be an effective tool to help maximize a community’s 
conservation efforts. Financial support for PDR programs can be raised through a variety of 
mechanisms—including bond initiatives, private grants and various taxation options. 
It is not clear to what extent the laws of Grenada would accommodate PDR programs. 
For a definitive take on this, more research is needed. However, since conservations easements 
are employed in this practice, is unlikely that PDR programs would be successful under the 
property laws of Grenada as they currently exist. 
E.   Leases, “Leaseback” Agreements, and Reserved Life Interests 
 
Long-term lease agreements between a private landowner and a conservation NGO or 
governmental agency are another potential method for achieving the goal of private lands 
conservation. A lease agreement can enable a conservation NGO to temporarily possess the 
property in exchange for rent payments. Conservation objectives can be met by including land 
use limitations in the lease agreement.82 
A “leaseback” agreement allows a landowner to donate or sell land in fee simple and 
immediately lease it back for an agreed use and period. In this case a landowner transfers title to 
the land to a conservation NGO or governmental agency. As part of the agreement, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
statutory impediments to the use of PDRs have been addressed in those states that have enacted the UCEA. In 
addition to providing protection against being extinguishment, for PDRs drafted as conservation easements under its 
provisions, the UCEA provides the basis for claiming both federal and state income and estate tax benefits. See 
Maureen Rudolph and Adrian M. Gosch, Comment, A Practitioner’s Guide to Drafting Conservation Easements and 
the Tax Implications, 4 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 143, 146 (2000). 
82  See ELI, at 30. In addition to stipulating detailed use-limitations, the lease could include a base-line ecological 
inventory of the land, using written descriptions, data, photographs, graphs, maps, etc. Breach of the use-conditions 
would normally entitle the landowner (or his or her heirs) to terminate the lease. This arrangement would provide 
the landowner with ongoing control over land use while providing some security of tenure to the conservation NGO. 
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conservation NGO leases the land back to the owner using a long-term lease, subject to 
conditions designed to ensure conservation of the land. Breach of the lease could enable the 
conservation NGO to terminate the lease and take possession of the land. 
A landowner could also transfer fee simple title to the land to a conservation NGO (by 
donation or sale), but reserve a life interest in the land. This method would enable the landowner 
to remain undisturbed on the land for life. The landowner also has the assurance that without 
further legal action the conservation NGO will assume control of the land upon the his or her 
death. 
It is likely that the laws of Grenada would accommodate leaseback programs and 
reserved life interests, which are a type of interest long recognized under the British common 
law. However, more research would be required to definitively make this assertion. 
 
VI. LEGISLATION AND INITIATIVES RELEVANT TO LAND CONSERVATION 
 
 This section attempts to provide a brief overview of legislation and other initiatives 
relevant to land conservation in Grenada.   
A. Legislation 
 
1. Carriacou Land Settlement and Development Act 83 
  
 This Act establishes a body called the Carriacou Land Settlement and Development 
Authority, and authorizes that body to regulate, control and develop land settlement in Carriacou 
as provided by the Act.84   The Board has the power to “[c]ontrol, develop and reorganize such 
lands as may be vested in accordance with the economic and social requirements of the 
community and with the need for conserving the natural resources of soil, forest and water.”85 
                                                 
83  Cap. 42 (1955). 
84  Id. at § 3(1). 
85  Id. at § 8(a). 
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The Board is also given the authority to select any land deemed necessary for the establishment 
of small holders “and for other public purposes connected therewith.”86  The Act endows the 
Board with the power to acquire property,87 and provides that where the Board is unable to 
acquire land by agreement and on reasonable terms it must report that fact to the Minister; 
additionally, if the Board requests—and the Minister agrees—it may acquire such land or 
building compulsorily under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.88 
2. Crown Lands Act 89 
 
The Crown Lands Act provides for the vesting of lands in the Governor-General for the 
public uses of Grenada—lands known as Crown lands.  Under this Act, the Governor General 
has the power to declare Crown Land as a forest reserve and to grant, rent, lease or sell those 
lands.  The Act also empowers “the competent authority” to attach conditions to the sale or lease 
of State lands—importantly, such conditions may include the requirement to observe good 
management practices on such land.  In addition to authorizing the Governor-General to make 
rules for the management of crown lands, the Act also grants the Government power to resume 
possession of lands, buildings and premises specified in the Schedule to the Act.  The Act 
stipulates the right of the Crown to mines and alluvial deposits of precious minerals. 
3. Forest, Soil and Water Conservation Act 90 
 
 In addition to setting forth the aims of governmental forest policy, this Act establishes a 
Forestry Department within the Ministry of Agriculture and provides for a Chief Forestry Officer.  
The Act also stipulates the following:   
▪  the Governor-General may declare crown land a forest reserve; 
                                                 
86  Id. at § 15(1). 
87  Id. at § 16. 
88  Id. at § 17. 
89  Cap. 73 (1896). 
90  Cap. 116 (1949) (amended 1984). 
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▪  the Governor-General may declare other crown land as protected forest 
when it is for a specified particular purpose; 
 
▪  power is given to the Minister to make rules to regulate or prohibit certain 
types of conduct within a protected forest; 
 
▪  private land may be declared a forest reserve and the Chief Forestry Officer 
shall mark out and keep the area defined; 
 
▪  the owner of private property declared to be a protected forest is to be 
compensated if he submits a claim with full particulars of the estimated loss; 
 
▪  estimated loss is determined by an Assessment Board; 
 
▪  a private owner can agree that his property be supervised by the Chief 
Forestry Officer; 
 
▪  crown lands may be a prohibited area for a specified particular purpose; 
 
▪  provides a procedure for the removal of persons in wrongful possession of 
crown lands; 
 
▪  procedure for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act. 
 
To date, only two forest reserves have been declared—Grand Etang and one area in Carricaou. 
The Grand Etang forest reserve contains approximately 3,800 acres.  
4. Grand Etang Forest Reserve Act 91  
 
The goals of this Act are to (1) preserve forest growth in the vicinity of Grand Etang, for 
the conservation and promotion of rainfall and the water supply of the island; (2) demarcate and 
delimit that area for enabling government to prevent encroachments being made in the forest 
reserve area; and (3) acquire private lands which fall within the boundaries of the demarcated 
area.  The Act stipulates that the lands so mentioned shall forever form part of Government land 
and shall be strictly reserved and set apart for the public purpose of forest conservation.92 
                                                 
91  Cap. 124 (1906). 
92  Id. at § 3. 
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5. Grenada Fisheries Act 93  
 
 The general purpose of this Act is to provide for the management and development of 
fisheries in the fishery waters of Grenada and for the appointment of Fisheries Officers.94  The 
Act authorizes the Minister to declare any area of the fishery waters a priority area; and endows 
the Minister with the power to take measures to ensure fishing in the area is not impeded.95  The 
Minister may also lease lands—including areas of the foreshore and seabed—for the purpose of 
aquaculture.96 
 The Act sets forth a number of purposes for which the Minister may declare any area of 
the fishery waters—and, as appropriate, any adjacent or surrounding land—to be a marine 
reserve where special protective measures are necessary.  These purposes include the 
following:97    
▪  to afford special protection to the flora and fauna of such areas and to 
protect and preserve the natural breeding grounds and habitats of aquatic 
life, with particular regard to flora and fauna in danger of extinction; 
 
▪  to allow for the natural regeneration of aquatic life in areas where such life 
has been depleted; 
 
▪ to promote scientific study and research in respect of such areas; or 
                                                 
93  Cap. 108 (1986). 
94  Id. at 3(1).  Section 40(1) authorizes the Minister to make regulations for the management and development of 
fisheries in the fishery waters for all or any of the following purposes:  
▪  the management and protection of marine reserves; 
▪  the taking of coral and shells; 
▪  the setting of fishing fences; 
▪  aqua culture development; 
▪  aquaculture operations; 
▪  regulating or prohibiting entry into land leased for the purpose of aquaculture or into waters 
superjacent upon such land; 
▪  prescribing any other matter which is required or authorized to be prescribed by the Act. 
95  Id. at § 21.  Section 23(2)(a)–(d) creates an offence if any one without permission in a marine area:  
▪  fishes or attempts to fish; 
▪  takes or destroys any flora and fauna other than fish; 
▪  dredges, extracts sand or gravel, discharges or deposits waste or any other polluting matter, or 
in anyway disturbs, alters or destroys the natural environment; or 
▪  constructs or erects any buildings or other structures on or over any land or waters. 
96  Id. at § 22(1). 
97  Id. at § 23(1)(a)–(d). 
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▪ to preserve and enhance the natural beauty of such areas. 
 
6. Land Development Control Act 98  
 
The Act provides for the orderly and progressive development of land in Grenada.  The 
Act established the Development Control Authority (DCA) whose technical arm is the Physical 
Planning Unit of the Ministry of Finance.99 The Act expressly prohibits land development in 
Grenada without the written permission of the DCA.100  The Act empowers the Minister, 
however, to direct that specific applications or a class of applications be referred to Cabinet for 
determination and to direct restriction of development permission in the national interest. An 
appeal lies to the Minister for determinations of the Authority and the Minister must refer such 
appeals to an appeals tribunal and act on its recommendations in making his determination. The 
sub-division of Agricultural lands is not included in the Act’s mandate, though Crown Lands that 
are developed for housing do require such approval from the Authority. 
The Act also authorizes the DCA to request, if it so desires, an Environmental Impact 
Assessment in respect to any application for permission to develop land in Grenada. The 
Authority is also given the mandate to identify, protect, conserve and rehabilitate the natural and 
cultural heritage of Grenada. 
 
                                                 
98  Cap. 160 (1968). 
99  Section 3(1) of the Act establishes the DCA, the members of which are appointed by the Governor-General and 
“shall include the Chief Technical Officers of Physical Planning, Public Works, Health Services, Agriculture and 
Housing.” 
100  Section 5(1) provides that notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no person shall commence to carry out 
development of any land in Grenada without the prior permission of the Authority.  
  Section 19(1), creates an offence and prescribes penalties for any person who commences or carries out land 
development without permission, or otherwise than in accordance with plans approved by the Authority; and under 
Section 19(2), a person who fails to comply with the conditions relating to a grant of permission for development is 
guilty of an offence. Section 19(3) provides that a person guilty of an offence against the Act shall be liable on 
summary conviction to a fine of ten thousand dollars and in the case of a continuing offence a fine of five hundred 
dollars a day. However, under Section 19(4), where a development is carried out in a manner which is at least ninety 
percent in accordance with the plans a person shall not be convicted but may be required to cause the development 
to conform to the approved plans. 
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7. Land Settlement Act 101 
 
This Act provides for the establishment of a corporate body known as the Land 
Settlement Development Board. Additionally, the Act stipulates the following:   
▪ the Board with the Ministers approval may purchase, take or lease land for 
the establishment of land settlement areas; 
 
▪ the Governor-General may compulsorily acquire land for the establishment 
and location of small holdings; 
 
▪ the Governor-General may by order declare any area of crown land in 
Grenada to be a land settlement area; 
 
▪  restrictions are placed on the alienation of land allotted and sold for small-
holdings; 
 
▪  the Minister makes regulations for administering and carrying into effect, 
the provisions of the Act. 
 
8. National Heritage Protection Act 102  
 
The National Heritage Protection Act sets out a Schedule of protected areas and 
empowers the Minister concerned with the cultural heritage of Grenada to amend that Schedule 
if he or she satisfied that other areas need to be similarly protected.  Additionally, the Act: 
▪  empowers the Minister to issue licenses after consultation with the Grenada 
National Trust, authorizing persons to extract, purchase, sell or enter into 
any transaction concerning Amerindian art; 
 
▪  appoints Officers for the purpose of enforcement; 
 








                                                 
101  Cap. 161 (1933). 
102  Cap. 204 (1990). 
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9. National Parks and Protection Areas Act 103  
 
This act authorizes the the Governor-General to proclaim any Government land to be 
national park.104  Under Section 5 of the Act, the Minister may declare Government land to be a 
protected area for the following purposes:105  
▪  preserving the natural beauty of the area, including the flora and fauna 
thereof; 
 
▪ creating a recreational area; 
 
▪  preserving an historic landmark or a place or object of historic, 
prehistoric, archaeological, cultural or scientific importance. 
 
The Governor-General is also empowered to add to a national park any Government land 
or any land leased to the Crown;106 or any private land leased or purchased by private treaty or 
donated for the purpose of its preservation and protection.107  The Act authorizes the Minister to 
create and promulgate general regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and 
specifically stipulates that such regulations may provide for the following:108  
▪ preservation of flora and fauna; 
 
▪ regulation and prohibition of hunting, shooting and fishing; 
 
▪  preservation and maintenance of water supplies and any water catchment 
area; 
 
▪  prevention of soil erosion, landslip, the formation of ravines and torrents, 
and the deposit of mud, silt, stones and other material in any water; 
 
▪  prevention and control of fires. 
 
                                                 
103  Cap. 206 (1990).   
104  Id. at § 4(1)(a). 
105  Id. at § 5. 
106  Id. at § 4(1)(b). 
107  Id. at § 4(1)(c). 
108  Id. at § 13(2)(a)–(e). 
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10. National Trust Act 109  
 
This Act establishes the Grenada National Trust, a body concerned with the preservation 
of places of historic and architectural interest or the natural beauty.  The general purposes of this 
body include the following:  
▪  the listing buildings and monuments of prehistoric, historic and architectural 
interest and places of natural beauty; 
 
▪  making the public aware of Grenada’s natural beauty; 
 
▪  the pursuance of a policy of preservation, and acting in an advisory capacity; 
 
▪  acquiring property for the benefit of the people of Grenada; and 
 
▪  promoting and preserving for the benefit and enjoyment of the people of 
Grenada submarine areas of beauty or natural or historic interest, and the 
preservation (as far as possible) of their natural aspect, features and animal, 
plant and marine life. 
 
Section 5 of the Act provides that whenever property, land, buildings, submarine areas, lakes or 
rivers become vested in the National Trust, the Council may by resolution determine that such 
land be held for the benefit of the people of Grenada; and any property so held cannot be sold or 
transferred to any person. 
11. Physical Planning and Development Control Act 110 
 
This recent Act broadens the perspective for development control in Grenada. While the Act 
maintains the DCA as the executing agency and defines the staff of the Physical Planning Unit as 
the staff of the DCA, the Act mandates the preparation of a Physical Plan for the whole of 
Grenada. The Act requires certain contents in the Physical Plan, including, inter alia: 
▪  setting out prescriptions for the use of land; 
 
▪  inclusion of all maps and descriptive matter to illustrate proposals; 
 
                                                 
109  Cap. 207 (1967). 
110  Cap. 25 (2002). 
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▪  allocate land for conservation or for use or development for agricultural, 
residential,  industrial, commercial, tourism as may be relevant; 
 
▪  make provisions for the development of infrastructure, public buildings, 
open spaces and other public sector investment works. 
 
12. Town and Country Planning Ordinance 111 
 
This Act establishes a Central Authority for land use planning in Grenada.112 The Act authorizes 
the Authority—with the approval of the Minister—to make general regulations for the 
procedures regarding the preparation and the adoption of development schemes.113  However, the 
Act also requires that such regulations receive the approval of the House of Representatives.114   
B. Conservation Initiatives 
 
1. National Forest Policy 
 
A new National Forest Policy was approved by the government in 1999. This policy 
gives the Forestry Department the responsibility for facilitating the implementation of the policy 
and in response to this a 10-year strategic plan was developed and was submitted early in 2000.  
In reference to biological diversity, the strategic directions of Forest Policy include: 
▪ creation of incentives and other mechanisms to encourage the conservation 
of privately-owned forests;  
 
▪ encouraging the participation of government and community stakeholders in 
programs for biodiversity conservation;  
 
▪ minimizing conversion of natural forest into plantations, especially in 
upland areas; 
 
▪ maintenance of representative samples of all forest ecosystems; 
 
▪  protection of all species which are important because of their endemicity, 
rarity or value; 
 
                                                 
111  Cap. 322 (1946). 
112  See also Town and Country Planning Regulations, S.R.O. 44/1965. 
113  Cap. 322, § 4(1). 
114  Id. at § 4(2), 
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▪  establishment and maintenance of a database on Grenada’s biodiversity; 
 
▪  building awareness and appreciation of biodiversity and its importance; 
 
▪  promotion of sustainable use of genetic resources for social, spiritual and 
economic benefits; 
 
▪  building capacity of Grenadian institutions to participate in the conservation 
and management of the country’s biodiversity; 
 
2. Dry Forestry Biodiversity Conservation, GEF Medium-Sized Project 
 
 This a project of the World Bank and the Government of Grenada for the purpose of 
achieving conservation goals with respect to dry forestry areas.  Approved in June of 2000, the 
project directs funds and coordinates efforts toward, inter alia, the following goals:  
▪ identification of ways to provide economic incentives to private landowners 
to manage their land in ways compatible with  conservation objectives. 
 
▪ assess the viability of providing incentives such as conservation easements, 
and seek other potential win-win opportunities for conservation; 
 
▪ work with private landowners to identify incentives and to promote 
voluntary conservation and habitat enhancement activities for key areas of 
dry forest on private lands; 
 
▪ establish partnerships and strategic alliances with private landowners, 
developers, business, NGOs and civil society to develop and promote 
conservation strategies; 
 
▪ provide technical assistance to landowners and developers for adoption of 
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A. Summary—National Parks and Protected Areas 
 






Use (Acreage) Land Use Proposal Admin. Status State Priv. 




















1. Grand Etang 
(including Mt. Qua 












Managed by Forestry Div. 
Min. of Agric.  
1,816  554  
GRAND ETANG 




Forest Harvesting  2,000 Acres managed as 
Forest Reserve by Forestry 
Department  
2,000   
 












Conservation Area  
120 Acres - Farms 
Corporation 428 - Priv. 
Admin. which includes 
Sugarloaf, Sandy and Green 
Island  
120  428 Kent's Agency 
Canadian Dev. 
Ltd.  




National Pk. Critical 
Conservation Area  















1. Lake Antoine  85  60% Agric. 40% Forest  
Area of Natural Interest Privately Administered  -  85 DeGale families 




Natural Landscape To 
be Preserved  
Privately Administered  -  2 acres F-Hamilton 
3. Annandale Falls  3  
Agriculture 
Recreation  
Natural Landscape To 
be Preserved  
Administered by Min. of 
Tourism and Forestry 
Department  
3  -  
4. Marquis River 
Falls  2  
Agriculture 
Recreation  
Natural Landscape To 
be Preserved  
Privately Administered  -  2  
5. River Sallee 





Natural Feature to be 
preserved  
Not Administered  -  1/4  
6. Marquis Island  8 Acres  Hunting Natural Cover  
Area of Natural and 
Scientific Interest  
Privately Administered  -  8  
7. Hog Island  70  Grazing Recreation  
Natural Features To be 
Preserved  
Privately Administered  -  70 Theodore 
family  






Critical Landmark To 
be preserved for its 
Recreational and 
Aesthetic Value  
Crown Lands Administered 
by Min. of Agriculture  
8  -  
 43
9. La Baye Rock  5  Dry thorn scrub Cactus Forest  
Natural Landscape to 
be preserved  









































a. Westerhall  36  Mangroves  IIw Classified  Not Owned    
4 Residents Assn. 
b. Chemin Bay  23  Mangroves  IIw Classified  Not Owned  12  11 Fort Jeudy  
c. Egmont Bay  25  Mangroves  IIw Classified  Not Owned  -  25  
3. Calivigny Island  12  Grazing Littoral Vegetation  
Not Classified  Privately Owned  -  12 Ken Milne  
4. Molinere Reef  655  Scuba Diving  Not Classified  Publicly Owned  655    
5. La Sagesse 
Salt Pond 










Area of Cultural and 
Historical Interest  
Administered by Min. of 
Agriculture  





















Area of Cultural 
Historical and Social 
Interest  
Privately Administered  -  4 DeGale family  
2. Westerhall 
Distillery  1  
Rum Production  Area of Cultural and 
Historical Interest  
Privately Administered   
 
1 acre  
3. Carib's Leap  2  Recreation  Area of Historic Importance  
-  -  2 Roman Catholic 
Church  
4. "The Tower" St. 
Paul  11  
Residential 
Recreational  
Historical Monument  Privately Administered  -  11 Slinger family  
5. Fort George  5  National Security Area of Cultural and Historical Importance  
Publicly Administered  5  -  
6. Fort Frederick  4  National Security Area of Cultural and Historical Importance  
Publicly Administered  4  -  







Privately  N/A  -  
8. Mt. Rich Cultural 
Landmark  3  
Agriculture  Area of Historic & 
Cultural Interest  















1. Annandale Water  506  
Forest 
Agriculture 
Water supply  
Multi-use Area  Forestry Division 
Administered  
506  -  
2. Concord Water  240  
Forest 
Agriculture 
Water Supply  
Multi-use Area for 
Water Production  
Publicly Administered  -  240 F. Hamilton & 
Others  
3. Mt. 
Hope/Calabony 655  
Forest 
Agriculture 
Multi-use Area for 
Water Production  
Privately Owned  "  655  
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Watershed  Water Supply  






















1. High North 




National Pk. Critical 
Forest Conservation 
Area  
Nature Reserve State Lands  300  306 128 acres 
Packard 100 acre 
Jones, Sylvester 















1. Fossil Beds at 
Grand Bay  
 
 















1. Lauriston Pt. 
Sandy Island 





Natural Landscape and 
coral reefs to be 
preserved  
Islands are Government 
owned. Coral reef & Point 
are public  
584   
 
2. Tyrrel Bay 





Area of Natural & 
Scenic Interest Oyster 
Harvesting is 
compatible  
Crown land not managed  280  -  
3. White Island 






Area of Scenic Interest 
Coral reefs are among 
the best in Grenada  
Coral reefs are 
Public/Privately 
Administered Islands  
74  490  
4. Sabazan  6  Grazing  Area of scenic & historic interest  
Public/Private  3  1  
5. THIBAUD Limlair 
Estate Cemetary, 
Tomb & Well  
15  
Cemetery  Area of Scenic Cultural 
& Educational Value  
 
 
















Belair Estate (and 
Hospital View)  6  
Agriculture 
Hospital  
Area of Cultural 
Historical & 
Educational Value  
Crown lands Administered 
by Gov't  
6  -  
Dover Ruins  4  Grazing Ruins  
Area of Historic & 
Educational Value  
Private Ownership   
 
2  





















Forest Reserve  36  Quarrying Grazing  
Watershed Protection  Crown lands  36   
 
Chapeau Carre  12  Forest Reserve  Watershed Protection  Crown lands  12    
 
 
B. Taxes in Grenada 
 
▪ Corporate tax: 30 percent on annual net profit (waived for approved enterprises).  
▪ Common external tariff (CET): 5 percent  to 40 percent on the cost plus insurance plus freight 
(CIF) value of the landed price of goods purchased outside of Caricom. Duties where 
applicable are calculated on the CIF or on the cost and freight if the goods are not insured 
(waived for approved enterprises).  
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▪ General consumption tax: All imported goods: 25 percent on the CIF value plus CET. The 
consumption tax is compounded except on qualifying Caricom imports (waived for approved 
enterprises).  
▪ Locally manufactured goods tax: 10 percent.  
▪ Customs service charge: 5 percent on the CIF value of imported goods.  
▪ Personal income tax: There is no personal income tax for those earning less than EC$60,000 
annually. Personal income tax of 30 percent is payable on annual earnings in excess of 
EC$60,000.  
▪ Withholding tax: 15 percent payable on non-resident management fees and royalties (waived 
for approved enterprises).  
▪ Property transfer tax: Nationals pay 5 percent of the value of the land with or without 
improvement. Foreigners pay 15 percent of the value of the property and 10 percent on 
property other than land.  
▪ Landholding tax: Paid by non-nationals at a rate of 15 percent of the value of the land with or 
without improvement.  
▪ Capital gains tax: None. 
▪ Annual stamp tax: Tax on gross receipts levied in three stages. 
 
Property Tax—the charge placed by Government on Real Property. The Tax is an Ad valorem Tax 




Valuation takes into account the 
following: 
Location  
• Development potential  
• Type of land  
• Size of land and other relevant 
factors  
• Condition of Building 
Current rate available:  
Two separate rates are set for each class of property. A rate for 
the building and the other for land. The rates are as follows: 
Classification Land Building
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Who pays the tax:  
The tax is payable by the owner, as well as 
by occupiers of buildings on Extended 
Family Land. Tenants of Property are also 
entitled to pay Property Tax where an 
Arrangement is stipulated in the Lease 
Agreement. The Tax is made payable to 
the Government of Grenada. 
When the tax is due:  
The tax is due and payable from the 1st 
January each year. The property owner is 
entitled to 5% discount if 50% of the tax is 
made payable by March 31st and the 
remaining 50% is made payable by June 
30th. From July 1st, 10% fine shall be 
added plus 2% each month, if the tax 
remains unpaid. 
Exemptions:  
An exemption of $100,000.00 is deducted from the building value 
of an owner occupied property. Only one property can be given a 
homestead exemption. The remaining Assessed Value is 
multiplied by the classification rate: Agricultural lands are also 
entitled to an exemption but must first get a certificate from the 
Chief Agricultural Officer, before 90% of the tax can be exempted.
Where are the taxes payable:  
All property Taxes can be made payable at 
the Inland Revenue Department on the 
Carenage or the District Revenue Office in 
arish. each p
Alien License:  
Alien wishing to purchase 
property in Grenada must 
apply to the Prime 
Minister's Office for a 
License to hold property. 
Property Transfer Tax:  
Alien rates are 10% of the 
consideration when applying as a 
Purchaser, and 15% when acting as 
the Vendor. The first $20,000.00 is 
exempted. Excess taxed at 5%. 
 
The rights of the Taxpayer to object and appeal: The Taxpayer can object within fourteen days after been 
served with a Valuation notice. 
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